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HEALTH NOT WEALTH
DANIEL GROS
ABSTRACT
Health, and not wealth, should be the decisive criterion when considering the prospects of the
Central and Eastern European candidates for EU membership and the capacity of the EU to
enlarge. Viewed from this perspective, the outlook is promising. The CEECs are still very
poor, compared to most of the existing EU members, but they are also much more dynamic.
Their growth rates are generally expected to remain around 4-5% for the foreseeable future,
compared to about 2-3% for the EU. This still implies that full catch-up in terms of GDP per
capita will take decades, rather than years, but full catch-up is not the relevant goal if one is
concerned about enlargement. Experience in the EU has shown that problems are much more
likely to arise from established rich member countries with stagnant economies (Belgium in
the 1980s and part of the 1990s) than poor, but more dynamic states (e.g. Portugal and
Ireland today). The fact that most of the so-called ‘periphery’ is now experiencing stronger
growth than the ‘core’ confirms that EU integration benefits poorer countries even more.1
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This policy brief aims to serve as a basis for a useful discussion about the economic prospects
of the candidate countries and how they would fit into the EU (and EMU). It concentrates on
two specific aspects: Section I discusses the extent to which this enlargement is ‘specific’ in
terms of its size, the economic structures of the applicants and their past as socialist
economies. Section II then attempts to estimate the economic benefits of EU and euro area
membership. Tentative conclusions are offered at the end.
I. The specificity of this enlargement
1. The relative size of the candidate countries
It is often argued that this coming enlargement is unprecedented in terms of the increase in
population and other measures. This is not the case, however, if one considers the size of the
countries that joined during previous enlargements, relative to the size of the EC they joined.
Table 1. Size of the next enlargement compared with the previous ones
Population GDP in euro Trade
UK+DK+IRL as % of EC-6 33.5 27.9 13.1
E+P as % of EC-10 17.5 8.3 4.7
CEEC-10 as % of EU-15 28.0 4.1 10.9
Turkey as % of EU-15 17 2.4 7
Turkey as % of EU-25 13.2 2.3 6
Source: Own calculations based on EU and EBRD data.
This enlargement is thus significant in terms of population because all 10 Central and Eastern
European candidate countries (CEEC-10) would increase the population of the EU by over
one-quarter (the increase is equivalent to the increase in the German population due to
unification). By most economic measures, however, the candidate countries are negligible,
even if one assumes that their economies will grow rapidly.
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Table 2. Indicators of relative size in the accession countries (1998 data)
Money Deposits
Population in
millions
GDP at current
exchange rates (%
of euro area GDP)
GDP in PPS
(% of euro
area GDP)
M0: Cash
(% of euro
area total)
M1
(% of euro
area total)
M2
(% of euro
area total)
Demand deposits
(% of euro area total)
Time, Savings, Foreign
Currency Deposits
(% of euro area total)
Czech Republic 10.3 0.9 2.1 1.75 0.82 1.13 0.69 1.38
Estonia 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
Hungary 10.1 0.7 1.7 1.24 0.55 0.90 0.08 0.83
Poland 38.7 2.4 4.7 3.11 1.35 1.90 0.96 2.36
Slovenia 2 0.3 0.5 0.21 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.39
Latvia 2.4 0.1 0.2 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Lithuania 3.7 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04
Slovak Republic 5.4 0.3 0.8 0.57 0.27 0.40 0.22 0.50
CEEC-8 (total) 74.1 5 10.6 7.47 3.32 4.75 2.19 5.56
CEEC-3 (total) 59.1 4 8.5 6.1 2.72 3.93 1.73 4.57
Bulgaria 8.3 0.2 0.6 0.38 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.11
Romania 22.5 0.6 2.1 0.38 0.16 0.31 0.09 0.25
Turkey 63.5 2.5 7 1.18 0.51 1.95 0.35 1.6
1990-91 data
Portugal 9.9 1.3 2.2 1.94 2.2 2.51 2.5 3.9
Spain 38.9 9.8 11.0 21.31 11.64 8.53 9.4 14
Italy 56.8 21.0 21.4 27.2 17.68 29.2 9.6
Greece 10.2 1.7 2.3 2.91 1.29 1.77 0.8 2.2
Club Med (total) 116 34 37 53.36 15.3 30.49 41.9 29.7
Source: ECB, Monthly Report, February 2000; IMF, International Finance Statistics, April 1999. The data on money and deposits for the Club-Med countries is for 1998.HEALTH NOT WEALTH
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Table 2 above shows that in terms of GDP, evaluated at current exchange rates, the 10
accession countries combined would be about 1/15
th (6%) of the euro area. This corresponds
roughly to the weight of The Netherlands alone. Most of this, more than two-thirds, is
accounted for by the Luxembourg group. In terms of monetary indicators, the story is not
much different. Given that the candidate countries have rather small financial sectors their
combined monetary supply amounts to generally slightly more than 8% of the corresponding
euro area aggregate. This implies immediately that even serious problems with the banking
sectors in the CEEC-10 could never materially affect monetary conditions in Euroland.
Moreover, in the financial area most of the weight within the CEEC-10 is accounted for by
the relatively more advanced Luxembourg group of applicants.
2. The economic structures of the candidate countries
It is often asserted that the candidate countries in this round of enlargement are much poorer
and have ‘different’ economic structures. The first half of this assertion is widely known to be
true. Applying the most widely used indicator of living standard, GDP per capita at
purchasing power standards, the Luxembourg group is on average at about 50% of the EU-15
average. This is somewhat lower than the values for Portugal and Greece at the beginning of
the 1990s (several years after their accession to the then EC and eight years before their
participation in the euro area). See Table 3.
In terms of broad indicators of economic structures, however, it is difficult to find strong
systematic differences between the candidates and the poorer member countries. The share of
agriculture in GDP is already rather low in the Luxembourg group, around 5%, and in most
of the Helsinki group countries as well. The share of industry in GDP is also not notably
different from some current member countries. The fundamental reason why it is so difficult
to make any firm judgement about systematic differences in economic structure is that there
are large differences even among the present EU members. For example, in terms of the share
of industry in GDP, the range is large even only among the so-called ‘Club Med’
1 countries.
In both Portugal and Italy, the share of industry is rather high, at around 30% of GDP, but
this cannot be considered a sign of high (or low) level of development since Italy’s GDP per
capita is slightly above the EU average and Portugal’s is the poorest member country. By
contrast, industry is relatively much less important in Spain and Greece, providing only
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around 15% of GDP. As all four of these countries are successful members of the euro area
(with Greece having joined in 2001), there is apparently a very large range of economic
structures that is compatible with membership in EMU. On the basis of the limited data that
are available, it appears that the candidates do not fall outside this range.
In terms of employment the differences in economic structures would appear to be larger,
particularly with respect to Romania, Bulgaria and Poland where a huge part of the labour
force is officially employed in agriculture. While this will undoubtedly create social problems
in these countries and problems for the Common Agricultural Policy, it is less relevant to the
issue of EMU membership since value-added in this sector is such a small part of GDP.
Moreover, one cannot avoid questioning the reliability of the data and of the definitions used
for identifying farmers, particularly in the case of Poland and Romania. In the former
communist countries, many who are classified as farmers actually practice this activity only
on a part-time basis, and it appears that their average age is close to 60, so that their numbers
will be shrinking rapidly over the next years in any event. A comparison with the Club Med
is again instructive. The average here is actually the same as for the Luxembourg group, as
most Club Med countries share the characteristic of many applicants that the relative
productivity is particularly low in agriculture (the share in GDP is only a fraction of the share
in employment). The 1991 data for Portugal shown in Table 3 are actually almost the same as
the 1998 data for Poland both for industry and agriculture. Thus the concern over the large
share of employment in agriculture in the candidate countries is likely to be overstated.
3. Institutional structures
Is this enlargement different because the CEEC-10 are ‘transition’ countries, i.e. they have
not yet established an institutional infrastructure for a market economy? We would agree that
the institutional infrastructure in the accession candidates is weaker than in most current EU
members, but it seems that this weakness is just a consequence of low levels of income (per
capita).
Gros and Suhrcke (2000) find that the more advanced candidate countries in Central and
Eastern Europe have institutional frameworks that are judged by foreign investors, and in
surveys, as being ‘normal’ for their level of development (or even slightly better than one
would expect). There is little reason to believe that progress will not continue as the overall
catch-up process continues.HEALTH NOT WEALTH
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Table 3. Structural indicators of accession countries (1998)
Per capita GDP in
euro (% of euro
area per capita
GDP)
Per capita GDP in
PPS (% of euro
area per capita
GDP)
Share of
industry in
GDP (%)
Share of
agriculture in
GDP (%)
Employment in
agriculture
(% of total
civilian
employment)
Employment in
industry
(% of total
civilian
employment)
Degree of openness
(exports plus
imports, as % of
GDP)
Exports to EU
as % of total
exports
Czech Republic 24 60 32 4 6 32 61 62
Hungary 21 48 25 5 8 28 46 71
Poland 18 36 24 4 19 25 26 64
Estonia 16 36 18 6 9 26 85 79
Slovenia 44 68 28 3 12 34 54 63
Latvia 12 27 21 4 19 21 53 86
Lithuania 13 31 21 9 21 21 69 43
Slovak Republic 17 46 27 4 8 30 56
CEEC-8
(average)
21 44 25 5 13 27 56 65
CEEC-3
(average)
21 48 27 5 11 28 43 66
Bulgaria 7 23 22 19 26 26 46 58
Romania 8 27 32 16 40 25 30 70
Turkey 14 40 22 16 42.3 16.8 26 59
1991 data
Portugal 37.1 61 31 5 18 34 34 80
Spain 68.8 76.5 17 4 11 33 18 65
Italy 101.1 101.9 31 4 9 32 19 53
Greece 43.3 59.4 15 14 21 24 22 62
Club Med
(average)
63 75 24 7 15 31 23 65
Source: ECB, Monthly Report, February 2000; European Commission, 1999 Regular Reports, Statistical Annex of European Economy and “The agricultural situation in the EU: 1994 Report”. The data on
employment for Estonia are for 1997. For Greece the data are for 1993 (except for the share of agriculture in GDP which is for 1992).CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 2/GROS
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Gros and Suhrcke (2000) also show that the more advanced candidates actually have
financial sectors that are appropriate for their level of development, and it appears that the
transition is over in this area. This does not mean that there won’t be any problems, however.
The problems that erupted in the Czech banking sector in recent years serve as a reminder
that serious corporate governance problems might persist even in systems that are regarded as
rather strong. But a number of EU countries faced rather similar problems not so long ago.
Moreover, given the rapid pace of bank privatisation and take-overs by institutions from the
EU (although this is sometimes still politically controversial), most of these problems should
be overcome soon.
At any rate, the screening process should uncover any remaining institutional deficiencies. By
the time of their accession, the candidate countries should have an institutional framework
that is compatible with a smooth functioning of the EU.
II. The benefits of enlargement
The public discussion in the EU-15 about the budgetary cost of enlargement sometimes
obscures the fact that enlargement should bring economic benefits. In the candidate countries,
EU membership is often just taken as an economic imperative so that detailed calculations of
the economic benefits are not made. However, if one wants to gauge the long-term prospects of
Central and Eastern Europe, one has to have an idea of the likely size of these economic
benefits. How large will they be? This question is difficult to answer because everything
depends on the alternative scenario if they did not accede. For example, if one were to assume
that the Czech Republic could become a sort of Switzerland if it did not join the EU, one would
conclude that membership would not bring this country any appreciable economic benefit. For
its neighbour, the Slovak Republic, one might assume instead that the country would revert
back into Russia’s orbit and halt its reforms if it did not have the alternative of becoming a
member of the EU. These are admittedly extreme examples, but they are useful for highlighting
the general problem underlying any attempt to measure the welfare benefits of enlargement.
A further reason why it is difficult to quantify the economic effects of enlargement is that it
affects all aspects of the economy. One cannot therefore simply look at the impact of a number
of separate markets and total the results. This is why Baldwin et al. (1997) use a so-called
'computable general equilibrium' model taking into account the interactions between trade,
labour markets and investment via the capital markets, to mention only the most importantHEALTH NOT WEALTH
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elements of this type of model. They assume in a first 'conservative scenario' that the main
effect of EU membership is to reduce the cost of trading between the 10 associated states and
the EU by 10% and to eliminate trade barriers for agricultural products.
2 The first element is the
key to their results. The 10% reduction in trading costs reduces total costs by 2.5%, since in
their model the starting level of the cost of trading across borders is 25% of the transaction
value. With membership, this is supposed to go down to 22.5%. They find that under this
scenario real income in the candidate states would increase by about 1.5% and only 0.2% in the
EU. The small impact on the EU is understandable if one takes into account that exports to the
associated states account for about 2% of the GDP of the EU-15. However, one would expect
the impact on the CEECs to be much larger because their trade with the EU-15 accounts for up
to 25% of their GDP. Moreover, the 10% reduction in trading costs is completely arbitrary.
Such an ad hoc assumption is actually not necessary, since, as we will show below, it is
straightforward to use existing detailed estimates.
A gain of 1.5% for the candidate states thus seems very conservative, given the estimates that
have been made of the benefits from integration within the present group of member states.
Enlargement implies essentially an extension of the internal market and monetary union.
3 The
benefits of these two integration projects for the present membership have been estimated and
could be used as a guide. Recent estimates of the transactions cost savings from the
introduction of the euro are in the neighbourhood of 1% of GDP (see also Chapter 7 in Gros
and Thygesen, 1998). It is more difficult to estimate the gain from participation in the internal
market. Emerson (1998) found that this should yield welfare benefits of between 2.5 and 4.5%
of EU GDP. Could one use this estimate for the candidates as well? Several arguments would
indicate that the benefits for the CEECs should be at the larger end of this range, or even
higher. The key consideration is that all the CEECs are very small economies, which should
thus benefit more from the additional competition fostered by the internal market than the
larger and more diversified EU economies. Moreover, integration and market opening in the
EU has proceeded well beyond the sectors considered in the initial ‘1992’ programme.
                                               
2 Membership will also force the Central and East European countries to reduce their tariffs on
imports from the rest of the world. But since these imports are small compared to their imports from
the EU, this effect is not important for the size of the welfare benefits.
3 Since agriculture accounts for only a minor fraction (6-10%) of GDP, the gains from freeing trade in
this sector cannot be large in relation to GDP.CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 2/GROS
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Even if one does not take into account these elements, any estimate of the welfare gains for the
CEECs is bound to be higher than that for the EC-15 since intra-EU trade accounts for about
15% of EU GDP, whereas trade with the EU accounts on average for well over 20% of the
GDP of the CEECs. The benefits for the new members should thus be at least one-third higher:
4.4-6.0% of GDP for participation in the internal market and 1.3% for using the common
currency. Table 4 provides the details of these back-of-the-envelope calculations, which lead to
the result that EU membership should yield a measurable benefit of between 5.4 and 7.3% of
GDP for the CEECs.
4
Table 4. Measurable benefits to the CEEC-10 from EU membership
(as % of GDP)
Common currency 1.0 - 1.3
Internal market 4.4 - 6.0
Total 5.4 - 7.3
Source: Own calculations based on estimates for the EU-15 of the
gains from a common currency and an internal market.
These measurable gains are already sizeable, but much larger gains can be obtained if one
assumes that membership transforms conditions under which the associated countries have
access to the world capital market. At the present time, interest rates in the associated
countries are much higher than those in the EU, even for countries that have strong reputation
for price stability such as the Czech Republic, or operate a currency board, such as Estonia.
For other countries, e.g. Poland, the domestic real interest rate is even higher.
Where does this risk premium come from? Baldwin et al. argue that the risk premium that
one currently observes on interest rates in the associated states is not due to monetary factors,
but to uncertainty about the future of reforms. The crucial assumption then is that only
membership can assuage the doubts in the minds of investors and reduce this risk. Countries
that are not allowed to become members would not be able to assure investors about the
durability of their reform programmes. The size of the reduction in the risk premium that
would come with enlargement is difficult to pinpoint. Baldwin et al. use Portugal as an
example and argue that accession to the EU would imply a reduction in the risk premium of
about 15% (i.e. the real interest rate would drop from e.g. 9 to 7.65%). The result under this
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scenario is that real income in the associated states might increase by 30%! At first sight this
result is astonishing, but it actually should not be so surprising given that the models of
capital accumulation used by economists imply that the long-term capital stock is extremely
sensitive to changes in the real interest rate. (See Gros and Steinherr, 2001, for details.)
What should one think about these very large potential gains from membership arising from a
reduction in the risk premium? A first point to note is that this approach assumes that
investors will only upgrade the new members and not downgrade the existing ones. While
this is possible one could also argue that the new equilibrium of political forces within the
enlarged Union will make economically sound policies less likely (see the discussion about
'power politics' in agriculture above). The loss of the EU from a slight increase in its risk-
premium could easily exceed the gains of new members on account of a lower risk premium
for them. Moreover, the quantification of the gain in the risk premium is totally arbitrary. The
assumed alternative (continuing uncertainty about reforms) is not likely for those countries
that will actually be able to join first. The countries that will not be able to join because they
cannot implement the acquis would actually be those with the highest risk premium and thus
those that would benefit most from becoming members. For those that have the choice, a
reduction in the risk premium might thus not be the first source of advantage from
membership.
Nevertheless, these illustrative calculations of the potential gains from membership are useful
because they highlight one important aspect. There are certain gains from joining the internal
market and EMU that can be quantified. In our view these gains should be in the
neighbourhood of 5% for the associated states that are very open economies. But the
potentially more important gains are not quantifiable: they come from joining an area that
embodies the principles of open competition through the internal market rules in the largest
market of the world and that guarantees sound macroeconomic policies within the context of
EMU. This framework for sound policies should favour growth through a lot of channels and
might ultimately raise income by even more than 30%. But one has to admit that this is not a
judgement that can be proven with scientific methods.
Another useful lesson from these estimates is that the welfare gains for the EU are also real,
although much smaller in terms of the EU-15’s GDP. Expansion to the East would increase
                                                                                                                                                 
capital accumulation, which does not come for free (like the transaction cost savings from a common
currency) but require households to postpone consumption.CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 2/GROS
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trading opportunities for the EU-15. The CEECs account for less than 5% of the EU’s GDP
and about 10-15% of the EU’s external trade. As the gain from the internal market is about 4-
5% of the EU’s GDP, the gain to present EU members from the inclusion of the 10 CEECs in
the internal market and in the euro zone should thus be about 0.4-0.5% of GDP, or about 25
billion euro p.a. This alone would be more than the total budgetary cost. Moreover, the gains
for the EU can only grow over time as the economies of the associated states grow along with
their trade. Their share in the overall external trade of the EU has already doubled since 1990
and on the basis of current trends, it could well double again by 2005-06. At that point, the
estimated benefit would be twice as large as it appears from today's perspective, but the
budgetary costs would not increase proportionally. By the time the formal decision on
enlargement has to be taken, it is thus likely that the economic benefits of enlargement to the
EU-15 will even more clearly outweigh the costs than they already do today.
IV. (Tentative) Conclusions
The main findings of this paper are that the economies of most of the candidates (the CEE-8)
are not so different from those of the current EU-15 members that they would not fit into the
EU or the euro area and that their legal and institutional frameworks are clearly better than
one would expect given their low levels of income. Moreover, the candidates are likely to
benefit considerably from EU and EMU membership. This suggests that the long-term
economic prospects of the candidates are rather good. They start from a low level of income,
but they are likely to have healthy, growing economies, which might be better able to absorb
shocks than the more established economies of the richer EU member countries.
A number of studies by investment banks, international financial institutions and independent
economists suggest that the combination of low income (and wages), market access and a
stable institutional framework for a market economy should lead to growth rates of around 4-
5% over the next decade. This is considerably more than the 2-3% growth usually expected
for the (core) EU countries. While this would not lead to a quick catch-up, it suggests that the
new members are unlikely to cause problems within an enlarged EU or euro area.HEALTH NOT WEALTH
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